By Hagay Ringel
The war between Israel and Hamas raises crucial questions about the strategic goals of Israel and, more importantly, what Gaza will look like in the aftermath of the war. Central to this is the issue of who will assume control of Gaza, and what form that government will take. This complex question has sparked internal debates in Israel and triggered discussions on a global scale, dividing opinions between the Western world and the Arab world, and further splitting the international community.
The consensus is clear: the security situation in Israel, especially in the south, cannot remain as it was before October 7. It is widely accepted that Gaza should not be under the control of a radical Islamist organization under Iranian auspices, especially one with the goal of destroying Israel and murdering its citizens. The question then becomes, if not Hamas, who should govern Gaza?
Looking back at history, a potential model emerges in the successful reconstruction of Germany and Japan post-World War II. These nations underwent a process to ensure they did not revert to their destructive ideologies. While acknowledging the differences between these two nations and Gaza, applying this model to Gaza suggests a two-step approach: 1. to eliminate and defeat Hamas and other terrorist organizations, and 2. to demilitarize and deradicalize Gaza and ensure that Israel assumes full security authority.
One favored model, especially in the West and among a significant portion of Israeli leadership, is akin to the situation in Judea and Samaria in which Israel serves as the security authority while the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Mahmoud Abbas, handles civil matters. While this model has its merits when compared to the situation of Gaza under Hamas, caution is warranted. Drawing parallels between the situation in Gaza, Judea, and Samaria reveals ongoing terrorism, incitement in schools, and a failure of the PLO to recognize the rights of the Jewish population, including the right to a state and Jerusalem as its capital.
The viability of this solution raises a critical question: Is it realistic? To answer this, let’s revisit history. The PLO governed Gaza until 2007, when during a democratic election the majority supported Hamas (noteworthy given that many still support Hamas). However, after Hamas assumed control, they persecuted PLO members to the extent that some were thrown from roofs to their deaths. This model of governance is currently popular in the West, but is this the path we want to take? I have my doubts.
Another option is for Israel to assume full control of Gaza, both militarily and civilly. But numerous challenges accompany this approach. It would necessitate substantial resource allocation from Israel, particularly in terms of finances. Additionally, with a population exceeding two million, providing for and meeting the needs of Gazans would entail a considerable undertaking. A regime led by Israel would lack legitimacy among the Arab population and on the world stage, potentially resulting in actions against Israel, ranging from sanctions to the emergence of new terror cells in Gaza.
While this solution could offer a short-term bridge from the immediate aftermath of the war to a more permanent solution, it poses risks for the long term. Potential consequences include the radicalization of the Gazans, tensions in Israel regarding the reallocation of resources from internal needs, and a loss of legitimacy internationally.
Another proposed solution involves the participation of Western and moderate Arab countries to oversee the civil aspects in Gaza and to advocate for modern Western values. While this solution may seem ideal, it is fraught with complexities for several reasons. It is reasonable to assume that many of these nations are reluctant to immerse themselves in the challenges of Gaza, and may experience local resistance as a result. History shows that any intervention by the West attempting to impose democracy, freedom, and liberal values often results in failure, as witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The track record of UN forces attempting to establish order in various countries raises doubts about the effectiveness of this approach. Consequently, despite its seemingly perfect nature, this solution may be deemed naïve and unrealistic.
I propose a model based on the successful structure of the United Arab Emirates, termed “The Emirates Plan,” which operates on the belief that Arabs can govern themselves according to their tribal structure, adhering to their own rules, culture, and religion. The application of this method in the Gaza Strip involves dividing it into regions based on tribal affiliation, with each city or region led by the largest and most influential tribe. Israeli monitoring would ensure that these tribes do not abuse their power. For instance, one tribe might oversee Rafah, another Khan Yunis, and so forth, including refugee camps in Gaza City.
This approach aligns with the traditional Arab respect for tribal structure, acknowledging their primary source of loyalty. While Gaza may seem like a unified entity, significant cultural and dialectic differences exist between areas, occasionally leading to internal conflicts. This proposal suggests allowing them to determine their own life and governance. Each city or region would directly manage its civil affairs with Israel, preventing a united front against Israel or external support from entities like Iran. This setup encourages each “Emirate” to cultivate positive relationships with Israel and Western countries to gain benefits and legitimacy from their local population. Crucially, the plan stresses legitimacy among the locals to counteract the perception that the government is a Western imposition. The Emirates Plan does not dictate any specific leaders or organizations, allowing the locals to manage themselves based on their cultural context.
The idea of The Emirates Plan is gaining popularity in Israel. Originating in academia through Dr. Mordechai Kedar, a professor of Middle Eastern studies at Bar Ilan University, the concept has extended beyond universities to gain traction in the Knesset, the government, and Israeli security agencies, including the IDF. As past ideas have proven unsuccessful, it’s time to explore a new and creative approach that addresses the needs of both sides.
Hagay Ringel, an IDF veteran and Middle East Analyst, is a data analyst. He holds Master’s Degrees in Data Analytics and Trade Policy and Global Economics Governance.
