The kallah teacher received an unexpected call. A young lady had engaged her to prepare her in halachah. And now, the young lady’s would-be mother-in-law was on the phone.
The woman said, “Our side is about to break-off this shidduch. We have been made aware that the young lady is a kleptomaniac. This is not something that we wish to deal with in our family. We do not wish even to risk it. On the other hand, we did not wish to listen to false rumor without foundation.
“This is our request of you, though we fully understand if you do not wish to involve yourself. We would like you to leave a $100 bill in a position where it appears to have been dropped by accident and is unnoticed by you, and then leave the room. In this manner, you can test her to see if she is indeed a thief. Once again, we understand if you do not wish to involve yourself. But this is the last chance for this shidduch, as we have exhausted all other avenues of investigation.”
The kallah teacher was in a quandary. She had no desire whatsoever to be involved in this underhanded activity. On the other hand, if she could possibly save the shidduch of the young lady, perhaps she should do it. She decided to pose the question to Rav Yitzchok Zilberstein.
Rav Zilberstein’s Response
Rav Zilberstein responded (in the Cheshvan 5781 edition of Vavei HaAmudim Vol. LXXXVI Siman 11) that she should first investigate through the kallah’s friends. If they tell her that the concern is far-fetched and remote, then the kallah teacher should conduct the test — just to prove to the would-be mother-in-law that all is in order. But if the friends respond that there is substance to the allegation, she should not involve herself in the test.
Rav Zilberstein cited a responsum from the Sridei Aish (Vol. I #58) regarding a business owner who wished to test one of his employees as to whether or not he was trustworthy. He wanted to place money in a hidden spot and see if the employee would seek to find the owner or pocket it. The Sridei Aish cited a Tosfos in Kiddushin 32a that one is still in violation of lifnei iver even if at the outset the owner of the money was mochel.
The underlying question was the concept of lifnei iver — is it permitted to place a stumbling block before the employee? Rav Zilberstein concluded that if the possibility of the infraction occurring is remote, it is permissible to test.
A Fascinating Contradiction
In light of the recent passing of one of the gedolei ha’dor, Rav Dovid Feinstein, zt’l, this author would like to recount a conversation he had with Rav Feinstein, zt’l, some 17 years ago.
In the Talmudic texts that deal with the concept of lifnei iver, there is an apparent contradiction. Depending upon how we resolve the apparent contradiction, we will gain new insight into the parameters and guidelines of lifnei iver even beyond the cases under discussion themselves. It is this author’s view that the guidelines of Rav Dovid Feinstein, zt’l, differ substantially from the guidelines of Rav Zilberstein, shlita.
There is a concept known in halachah as teliyah — that whenever it is possible to assume a permitted purpose, even if that possibility is statistically or factually dubious, we do so.
The Gemara in Nedarim 62a tells us that Rav Ashi had an avah, a forest, that he sold to an avodah zara fire temple. When asked about lifnei iver, he responded that most of the wood would be for ordinary heating and not avodah zara. The Ran explains that it is permitted because of teliyah. The Ran’s view is cited by the Taz in Y.D. 151. The Chasam Sofer in a responsum (Y.D. #9) fully explains this idea.
However, there are other passages in the Gemara that indicate that there is a prohibition of lifnei iver whenever a strong likelihood of a violation exists. In Bava Metzia 75b, we see that it is a violation of lifnei iver to loan money when there are no witnesses. There is also such an indication from Bava Metzia 5b.
Three Approaches to Resolution
One approach to resolving the contradiction is that whenever there is a greater probability of a violation than a non-violation, then we do not assume a permitted purpose, and there is no lifnei iver. This is the approach of the HaGaos Tosfos Anshei Shem in Mishnayos Shviis 5:7 and the TaZ in Y.D. 151. This is also the approach of Rav Zilberstein in the above case of the suspecting mother-in-law.
Another approach is that the Talmudic cases that forbid it when the likelihood of a violation is stronger are only a rabbinic lifnei iver (see Tzitz Eliezer Vol. IV 5:3). [This would create an additional leniency, in case of a doubt, as we are more lenient on rabbinic lifnei iver than biblical lifnei iver.]
Rav Dovid’s Approach
Rav Dovid Feinstein, zt’l, related his approach to resolving the contradiction. He explained that if the action being performed will directly lead to a violation on the part of the recipient, and without it the recipient would not have had the desire to violate halachah, then it is a violation of lifnei iver. Rav Feinstein’s view is recorded in this author’s sefer on lifnei iver titled “Misguiding the Perplexed” on page 97. [It is also a possibility offered by the Tzitz Eliezer as well.]
Conclusion
It is this author’s view that Reb Dovid Feinstein, zt’l, would not have agreed to Rav Zilberstein’s psak. He would have instead ruled that the kallah teacher would not have been permitted to test the kallah, even if the kallah’s friends had reassured her that there is no basis to the rumors. This does not mean that one of these illustrious poskim is incorrect, chalilah. It just highlights the different approaches we find in halachah and in understanding of Gemaras.
Please say Tehillim for a refuah sheleimah for Rav Yair Nissan ben Sara.
